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By incorrectly reframing the issues on appeal, the State 
misidentifies the correct standard of review and fails to 
address the issues raised in Appellanf s Brief. 
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discussed more fully below. The most notable are: 
The State fails to address or respond to Collom's fundamental due process 
right to have Monica Winder removed from the courtroom during E.O.'s 
testimony; 
B. The State fails to address whether Monica Winder was a "victim" as defined 
in Idaho Code § 19-5306(3); 
C. The State fails to address or respond to important statements by the 
prosecutor, disparaging defense counsel and Collom personally, appealing 
to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury; and 
D. The State fails to address the cumulative nature of the errors. 
II. By incorrectly reframing the issues on appeal, the State misidentifies the 
correct standard of review and fails to address issues raised in Appellant's 
Brief. 
A. The State fails to address or respond to Collom's fundamental due 
process right to have Monica Winder removed from the courtroom during E.O.'s 
testimony. 
As identified in Appellant's Brief, Collom has a fundamental right to offer 
testimony of witnesses and to present his version of facts to the jury. (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 6, citing Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972)). Interference with a witness's testimony 
violates this fundamental Fourteenth Amendment right. Id. at 98. This policy and the law 
Idaho 108, 110 (Idaho 2006). this case, witness was to not 
(Trial p. 505, LL. 19-20; p. 507, LL 16-19). Therefore, even trial counsel failed to 
properly object, allowing Monica Winder to stay in the courtroom while E.O. testified, was 
Plain Error under the circumstances. Trial counsel did object, however, and brought the 
matter to the Court's attention "On the morning of April 13, 2015, immediately prior to 
going to trial .... " (R., pp. 268-269 of 336). 1 
The State attempts to reframe the issue as one of abuse of discretion under Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 615. (Respondent's Brief, p. 4). While it is true that Collom's counsel 
argued Winder's inappropriate conduct should prevent her from sitting at the "table" across 
from E.O because Winder violated the Court's March 26, 2015 exclusion order, the record 
shows that the fundamental problem was that Winder had instructed young E.O. to 
"withhold details" (Trial Tr. 505, L 20), to "limit her responses to 'yes' or 'no"' ... and 
to "refrain from providing any details about what she knew." (R., p. 269 of 336).2 
1 This conversation with the Court and the prosecutor was apparently not recorded. The 
details of the conversation are therefore not available in their entirety. The documents 
filed by Collom's counsel in support of a new trial demonstrate that the objection was 
raised before and during trial, however. Further, the context of conversations which are 
recorded (just before E.O. testified), demonstrate that Collom had previously objected 
and was specifically upset by the interaction between Winder and E.O., because Winder 
had attempted to interfere with E.0.'s "voluntary" testimony. 
2 Corroborated in the Trial Transcript at pp. 504-507. 
2 
the violation on is nothing 
establishes the State's claim that the trial court recognized the issue as one of a 
prerequisite to a claim that the Court acted within the bounds of that discretion and applied 
the appropriate legal standards. State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516 (2008). 
The State's entire argument, predicated on the discretion to leave a potential witness 
in the courtroom under Idaho Rule of Evidence 615, is not applicable. It is not informative 
to the fundamental question and claim of error raiied by Collom. Collom asserts that his 
Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because the Court allowed an adult (who had 
tried to interfere with the testifying witness's testimony) to sit at the trial table, across from 
the child witness (who clearly expressed that she felt "intimidated" by that adult) during 
the witness's trial testimony. Given the disparity of age and the relationship (Monica 
Winder was the mother of the alleged victim, who was one ofE.O.'s best friends), E.O.'s 
confirmation that she felt "intimidated" should be given significant consideration. 
\Vhat is undisputed is that Monica Winder and J.T.W. approached E.O. and told 
her not to testify freely and voluntarily (Trial Tr., pp. 504-507). E.O. told the judge that 
3 The Court's Exclusionary Order was broad. The Court had stated "My order expressly 
prohibits witnesses from discussing the case outside the courtroom, and that includes 
parents and children." (Rptr. Tr. on Appeal, Jury Pretrial Conference, March 26, 2015, p. 
61, LL. 1-4 ). The record also shows that Monica Winder was aware of that admonition, 
because she heard it Id. at p. 62, LL. 1-2. 
3 
courtroom. Memorandum 
of Motion for Trial). These facts Collom's contentions remain 
The State has a primary and fundamental obligation to "see the defendant receive[ s] 
a fair trial. State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249,251 (1971). Wben a "substantial right" of a 
defendant is affected, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any 
error affecting the defendant's substantial rights did not "contribute to the verdict 
obtained." State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140 (2014); Idaho Criminal Rule 52. The State 
has failed to address Collom's fundamental Fourteenth Amendment right, clearly raised in 
his Appellant's Brief. 
It cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that Monica Winder's presence did not 
interfere with the testimony of one of Collom's witnesses, in violation of his Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights. 
The State has therefore failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error 
claimed by Collom did not contribute to the verdict. 
B. The State fails to address whether Monica Winder was a "victim" as 
defined in Idaho Code §19-5306(3). 
The State continues to claim, just as it did at trial, that Monica Winder had the right 
to be present and sit across from E.O. during her testimony because she was a "victim" as 
4 
or not was 1S a 
Furthermore, there was a complete failure to recognize Collom's competing fundamental 
Amendment and, at a minimum, to balance Collom's constitutional 
interests against Monica Winder's. The State argues, "First, the witness was a victim by 
and therefore exempt from exclusion under l.R.E. 615." (Respondent's Brief, p. 5). 
Neither the Court nor the State has ever undertaken to support this conclusion. Such an 
analysis would require ( at a minimum) considering whether the alleged victim was of "such 
youthful age or incapacity as [to] preclude [him] from exercising [his] rights personally." 
Idaho Code § 19-5306(3). Had an effort to apply a particular standard to the facts been 
undertaken (particularly with respect to the concerns raised by Collom that his witness had 
been interfered with and intimidated), the underlying problem and Collom's fundamental 
right would likely have been recognized and identified. Instead, the basis for the trial 
court's decision to allow Monica Winder to remain in the courtroom during E.O.'s 
testimony is unclear. We are left to wonder whether the Court perceived the matter as one 
of discretion; whether its decision was based on I.R.E. 615, Idaho Code §19-5306(3) or 
Article I, Sec. 22, of the Idaho Constitution; or whether its decision was based on something 
else. Thus, even an argument that the trial court did not abuse its discretion cannot be 
supported. 
5 
a was not m case.4 
C. The State fails to address or respond to important statements by the prosecutor, disparaging defense counsel and Collom personally, appealing to the 
emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury. 
"It is improper to disparage defense counsel." (Respondent's Brief, citing State v. 
146 Idaho 15, 19 (Ct App. 2008)). Conceding this point, the State contends the 
prosecutor did not disparage defense counsel or direct comments toward defense counsel, 
' but merely "commented" on "defense arguments and theories." (Respondent's Brief, p. 
13 ). It is quite easy to disprove the State's claims by reference to the record. A few samples 
include: 
"\Vhy do I talk about a parade? Because the defense has 
entered a whole lot of floats. They paraded people up here 
as quick as they could get them in and out yesterday." 
4 The State's focus on the fact that "Collom has failed to show error in the denial of his 
motion for new trial" illustrates the problem. On appeal, Collom occasionally cites to his Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial because that portion of the record 
refers to arguments and evidence as they unfolded prior to and during trial, which may 
assist this Appellate Court in understanding Collom's arguments. Notably, however, Collom did not appeal the District Court's denial of a new trial under Idaho Code § 19-2406. The actual issue is whether or not Collom was denied the right to a fair trial because (I) no remedial action was taken to address the interference and intimidation of 
one of Collom's witnesses and (2) the intimidator was allowed to sit across from a young 
child witness, during her testimony, after she had expressed to the Court that she felt intimidated. 
6 
s 
IS a prepared to use artifice to awe 
and bamboozle the jury. Having labeled defense counsel, the prosecutor then endeavors to 
convince the jury there is a difference (not in the evidence) but in the character of defense 
counsel (and Collom) and the prosecutor (and his victim): 
"They entered all these floats and bands into the parade. 
Why did they do that? Again, they want to shift your focus 
away from that individual and put it on that kid back there. 
They want to say look over here, don't look over there. We 
call that a squid or an octopus defense." 
(Emphasis added; Trial Tr., p. 566, LL. 3-8). Who are "they," and who are "we?" Clearly, 
"they" are the conductors of a charade; the bad guys. "We," on the other hand, represents 
those being attacked by a predator - the victims - the good guys. 
Significantly, the prosecutor's references to defense counsel as a circus conductor 
followed immediately after he vilified defense counsel for forcing E.O. to go to Court and 
testify. The prosecutor stated, 
"I feel bad for E.O. because she had to leave a test at school 
to come over here. And you could tell she was pretty upset. 
She had a hard time testifying. She did a good job. She felt 
bad that she had to be here." 
(Emphasis added; Trial Tr., p. 564, LL. 16-20). What kind of monster forces a young girl 
to leave an important school test just so she can appear as another float in its parade? A 
squid or an octopus. 
7 
assassination. (Respondent's Brief, p. 16). The prejudice derives from the prosecutor's 
attack on defense counsel's character. The prosecutor conspicuously imputed that defense 
counsel's character was so poor that he would stoop to forcing young and innocent E.O. to 
leave her important test,just so she could be a side show in defense counsel's parade. Aside 
from comparing the character of a cold and calloused defense counsel to that of the 
prosecutor, what relevance do these comments have to the case? Why would it matter, 
otherwise, how the prosecutor ("I" in his words) feels? 
There is an even deeper layer, however, when the comment is placed in complete 
context. Why was E.O. upset and had a "hard time testifying?" The prosecutor tells the 
jury that E.O. was upset because "she felt bad that she had to be here." Id. The jury did 
not know the real source of E.O.'s distress; the mother of her best friend, who had 
instructed her not to "volunteer" information and had "intimidated" her, got to sit directly 
across from her while she testified. The State therefore turned the criminal act of 
interfering with a witness into a bonus for the State by playing to the passions and 
8 
against that of defense counsel and Collom. 
prosecutor asked members the jury to consider what they would if their ovvn 
came to them and told them that their child had been sexually abused. Defense counsel did 
object to this line of questioning. (Trial Tr., p. 597, LL 19-25 - p. 598, LL 1-11). 
Understanding the prosecutor's theme of comparing the "character" defense 
counsel with that of the prosecutor helps to better understand the comparison of defense 
counsel with the Billy Flynn character in the play and movie Chicago. Significantly, at no 
time did the prosecutor focus on any evidence when talking about the sleazy defense 
attorney played by Richard Gere. Rather, he focused on how criminal defense counsel use 
"razzle-dazzle" to bamboozle the jury. Commenting on defense counsel's character, the 
prosecutor paraphrased Gere, stating: "I'm going to give them the little razzle-dazzle over 
here, to make you guys look in this direction. Okay? Vv'hile his client just slid out the 
backside and got away with it." (Emphasis added; Trial T., p. 567, LL. 5-8). The theme 
remains clear and consistent; defense counsel is a monstrous squid or octopus. 
5 Similarly, the comment by the prosecutor that J.T.W. "wasn't a bad employee" is a 
comment on the character of the individuals involved, and is clearly directed toward the 
individuals. There is a difference between talking about the evidence, and the facts, such 
as discussing what J. T. W. did or did not do as an employee, as opposed to providing 
personal opinions about the character of the alleged victim. 
9 
(Emphasis added; 567, 9-1 \\lhose defendant is s 
defense squid's defendant. 
Contrary to the State's argument, the prosecutor's emphasis was not on any 
evidence or argument, but the defense "hiding" behind "our" ink cloud. The prosecutor 
concludes "I'm asking you to look past their parade of witnesses and through their ink 
cloud." (Emphasis added; Trial Tr., p. 567, LL. 14-15). It is disingenuous to suggest the 
comments are anything but an unabashed attempt to appeal to the jury's passions and 
prejudices by comparing the helpless victim and his attorney against the predator defense 
counsel and his voracious client It should not be lost on this Court that the next comment 
by the prosecutor was "Let's talk about the facts." (Trial Tr., p. 567, LL. 16). 
The fact that defense counsel addressed the prosecutor's comments in closing is 
certainly not representative of a tactical decision to be associated with a circus trickster, a 
sleazy (win at all costs) defense lawyer or a monstrous predator. Defense counsel's 
subsequent argument reflects that defense counsel simply did not appreciate the level of 
inappropriateness of the prosecutor's underlying theme at the time it occurred. Failing to 




alcoholic hP,JPr<>cn~c at 18. 
5 App. 2008). 
told the officer he had not consumed 
because the defendant had placed his 
credibility in issue, and admitted to lying in connection with the case, the court concluded 
that the "troubling" conduct did not amount to misconduct. Id. at 19. 
The prosecutor also "disparag[ ed] defense counsel and vouch[ ed) for his O\\TI 
credibility," however. Id. The instructions of the higher court in Gross, that a "prosecutor 
should exercise caution to avoid interjecting his or her personal belief and should explicitly 
state that [his] opinion is based solely on inferences from evidence presented at trial" (Id.), 
should have been heeded in this case. If the law was not sufficiently clear prior to Gross, 
it certainly was by the time the prosecutor maligned defense counsel and injected his 
personal belief and opinion without any reference to the evidence in the present case. 
Turning a blind eye to such conduct is, at a minimum, a tacit approval of such behavior. 
In Gross, the prosecutor stated that defense counsel was just "doing [his] job." It 
is not a compliment (in the eyes of a jury) to compare criminal defense counsel to a slick 
and dishonest la\\ryer, even if that "slick" lawyer is smooth and successful. The prosecutor 
in Gross also "engaged in misconduct by suggesting that the jury should trust and believe 
the officer and the prosecutor because they represented the State and, therefore, must be 
ethical." The prosecutor in this case did the same, and worse, as described above. In the 
11 
defendant. at 18. is not a 
admonition to follow if a prosecutor remembers that he or she represents the state, 
upholding constitutional principles associated with ensuring a fair trial are as important 
as obtaining a conviction. 
Just as defense counsel failed to object in Gross, defense counsel failed to object to 
the prosecutor's aspersions in the present case. As recognized in State v. Gross, supra, 
Collom has a fundamental and substantial right to not have his attorney ( or himself) 
portrayed as dishonest or sleazy, however. When prosecutorial misconduct rises to the 
level of fundamental error, the court must then consider whether the misconduct prejudiced 
Collom's right to a fair trial or whether it was harmless. Id. The Gross court explained 
"The test for whether prosecutorial misconduct constitutes harmless error is whether the 
appellate court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result of the trial would 
not have been different absent the misconduct." Id. 
Given the clear holdings in cases like State v. Gross, it is indisputable that Collom 
had a fundamental due process right that was violated if the prosecutor committed 
misconduct. The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that misconduct did occur. The 
standard is whether the appellate court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
result of the trial would not have been different absent the misconduct. The necessary 
conclusion is that Mr. Collom is entitled to a new trial. Collom has demonstrated that his 
12 
considering scantiness evidence Collom had 
engaged any wrongdoing) that Collom was denied a fair trial and his Fourteenth 
Amendment rights were violated. It is the State's burden to provide Collom with a fair 
trial. State v. Haggard at 251. It clearly did not do so. 
D. The State fails to address the cumulative nature of the errors. 
The State's misstatement of and the reframing of the issues, in order to ignore or 
disregard the issues and arguments presented to this Court in Appellant's Brief, results in 
virtually no analysis of Collom's claims of cumulative error by the State. Each of the issues 
presented in Appellant's Brief and expounded upon in this Brief demonstrates that the 
accumulation of irregularities, when combined, show an absence of a fair trial in Don 
Collom's case. See, e.g., State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 573 (2007) 
III. CONCLUSION 
Don Collom respectfully asks that this Court vacate the judgment and conviction 
of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, and enter a judgment of acquittal. 
Alternatively, Collom asks that the judgment be reversed and remanded to the District 
Court for a new trial. The State has failed to object or respond to the salient issues raised 
in Collom's appeal, and Collom's claims and requests are primarily unrebutted. 
13 
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